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 Theoretical research on bank capital has primarily focused on the existence and 
determinants of optimal bank capital ratios (see, e.g., Orgler and Taggart (1983); Myers and 
Rajan (1998); Diamond and Rajan (2000); Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011)). An increasing 
body of empirical research provides support for the existence of an optimal capital structure 
(e.g., Marcus (1983), Flannery and Rangan (2008); Schaeck and Cihak (2011)). However, shocks 
to the actual and optimal capital ratios may create a wedge between the two. In this paper, we 
investigate, in a global context, an important aspect of bank capital management, i.e. the 
adjustment process to target capital. In particular, we provide answers to the following three 
questions. If banks’ observed capital ratio deviates from their optimal or target capital ratio, 
which adjustments do they make to achieve those targets? Is the speed of adjustment to the target 
capital ratio homogeneous across countries? What affects the speed at which banks (de)leverage? 
These questions remain largely unanswered in the academic literature on bank capital, though 
they are of major importance for understanding adjustment costs, stress tests, the dynamic 
unwinding of financial crises, and the feedback loops between the financial sector and the real 
economy.  
 To address these questions, we model bank capital ratios using a partial adjustment 
framework with bank-specific and time-varying targets and heterogeneous adjustment to the 
target. Our empirical setup and rich international sample yield novel results for the capital 
structure and banking literature streams and offer new insights into an optimal regulatory design. 
Our contribution is twofold. 
 The first contribution of this study is an assessment of the balance sheet transactions 
banks rely on when they need to alter their capital ratio to reach the target level. We decompose 
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the growth of equity, assets, and liabilities into their constituents and explore the underlying 
drivers. On the one hand, banks that need to reduce their leverage3 primarily raise equity (either 
through share sales or retained earnings), rather than by curtailing asset growth. While asset 
growth is lower for under-capitalized banks, it is still positive. This phenomenon is perhaps 
surprising because it is generally thought that undercapitalized banks confront large costs of 
raising equity. Furthermore, in sample splits based on bank size, we find that smaller institutions 
are more prone to rely on fire sales for de-levering. On the other hand, banks that are above their 
target capital ratio lever up by expanding assets rather than by reducing capital. For such banks, 
the growth in reserves and retained earnings is slower. At the same time, assets grow 
substantially faster. The results of these analyses shed more light on the ongoing debate of 
whether and how firms and banks manage their capital structure. 
 Previous work primarily focuses on the impact of the bank’s environment on its optimal 
capital ratio (in limited samples). In line with Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and the corporate finance 
literature, the modeling approach often allows for partial adjustment to these equilibrium target 
ratios. However, most studies assume that the speed of adjustment is uniform across all banks.4 
Our second contribution is to relax the homogeneity assumption in the speed of adjustment. We 
document a substantial amount of cross-country heterogeneity in bank adjustment speeds across 
the globe. The average speed of adjustment in the overall sample is 0.29. This indicates that each 
year, the typical bank closes about a third of the gap between its actual and its desired capital 
ratio. Put differently, it takes on average two years for a typical bank to close half the gap 
                                                          
3 We use the terms “leverage” and “bank capital” interchangeably to refer to the equity-to-asset ratio. 
4 The few banking studies that allow for heterogeneous adjustment predominantly focus on a single country and 
examine whether undercapitalized banks exhibit faster adjustment (e.g., Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and 
Oztekin (2008) and Memmel and Raupach (2010)). 
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between its actual and target capital ratio.5 The cross-country standard deviation in the speed of 
adjustment is 0.15, implying a half-life of 4.26 years for sluggish adjusters (i.e., banks whose 
speed of adjustment is one standard deviation below the sample mean) and a half-life of 1.15 
years for flexible adjusters.  
 We investigate how cross-country variations in the macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment affect the speed at which banks converge to their target capital ratios. The speed at 
which banks reverse the deviations from their target capital ratio should vary with the cost and 
benefits of adjusting the leverage. We show that adjustment speeds plausibly vary with factors 
affecting the costs of external financing, bank financial flexibility, and the costs of financial 
distress. More specifically, we find that banks operating in countries with stricter capital 
requirements and multiple supervisors adjust more quickly. These findings suggest that stricter 
capital requirements reduce agency conflicts between equity holders and debt holders, whereas 
better supervision mitigates information asymmetries among financial agents, resulting in lower 
external financing costs. Similarly, more developed stock markets decrease the transaction costs 
associated with external financing and lead to faster adjustment, especially for undercapitalized 
and less profitable banks that do not or cannot readily rely on their retained earnings for the 
capital structure adjustments. Inflationary environments are associated with lower financial 
flexibility and slower adjustment. Banks also make faster capital structure adjustments in times 
of crisis, probably because of closer scrutiny by supervisors and other stakeholders. These effects 
are also large in economic magnitude. In general, our conclusions continue to hold in alternative 
subsamples that exclude crisis periods or focus on commercial banks and banks that are not 
                                                          
5 The half-life, i.e. the time it takes to close half of the gap between the current value and the target, is an often used 
concept in partial adjustment models. It is computed as log(0.5)/log(1 – speed of adjustment). 
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restructuring. These findings reveal the importance of a country’s macroeconomic and regulatory 
framework for bank capital structure management.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our dataset and evaluates some 
established stylized facts in the literature for our worldwide sample of banks. Section 3 
documents the capital structure adjustments banks make to get back to target when they are over- 
or undercapitalized. Section 4 consists of three subsections (hypotheses, empirical methodology, 
and results) dealing with the sources of heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment. Section 5 
concludes the paper with suggestions for further research and policy implications. 
  
2. Bank Capital Structure: An Initial Observation 
To benchmark our results with the existing empirical corporate and bank capital structure 
literature streams, we reassess some of the typical attributes of non-financial corporations and 
confirm that they also hold for our global sample of banks. In particular, we investigate whether 
(1) bank fixed effects dominate the variation in bank leverage, (2) the reliably important factors 
of corporate leverage explain bank leverage, and (3) the adjustment to bank target leverage is 
partial and heterogeneous. To begin, we discuss the sample construction and the partial 
adjustment model commonly used in the literature. 
2.1. Data 
To gain insights into how banks worldwide manage their capital structure, we combine 
data from several sources. We obtain information on banks’ balance sheets and income 
statements from Bankscope, a database compiled by Fitch/Bureau Van Dijk from publicly 
available data. The database is adjusted (e.g., to account for differences in accounting standards) 
to facilitate the international comparison of banks’ financial statements. Although most of the 
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bank-specific variables are ratios, variables in levels (e.g., bank size) are also adjusted for 
inflation and are converted into millions of U.S. dollars. The sample covers the 1994–2010 
period. We use data on commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, and bank holding 
companies (BHCs), which represent 61.4%, 13.4%, 14.8%, and 10.4% of the sample, 
respectively.6  We apply several selection criteria. First, most of the capital management 
decisions take place at the ultimate owner level. Therefore, whenever a bank reports both 
consolidated and unconsolidated bank accounts, we drop the latter to avoid double counting. 
This affects approximately 6% of our sample. Second, we drop bank-year observations with 
missing data on basic variables. Third, to avoid short-panel bias, we delete banks that report 
information for at most three consecutive years. Fourth, to ensure we have reasonable cross-
sectional variation within each country, we exclude countries for which we have information on 
less than 100 bank-year observations. Subsequently, we winsorize all variables (ratios as well as 
variables in levels) at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the impact of outliers.  
 We link the bank-specific data to various country-level databases that contain 
information on the macroeconomic environment as well as the regulatory and supervisory 
framework. More specifically, we obtain data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
database, compiled by the World Bank (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008)), the World 
Development Indicators database, and a worldwide database on deposit insurance (Demirguc-
                                                          
6 The sample of BHCs is spread across 41 countries, but is more concentrated in the U.S. The ratio of the BHC 
observations to the total number of observations is approximately 15% in the U.S. and 2% in the rest of the world. 
We include Bank Holding Companies in our sample since they are the ultimate owners and capital management 
generally takes place at the consolidated level. This sampling strategy also permits ready comparison with existing 




Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005)). Filtering the bank-specific data and matching it with the 
country-level data yields a sample of 20,073 banks from 64 countries, totaling 154,065 bank-year 
observations. The sample consists of a mix of developed and developing countries. Table 1 
provides information on the definition, source, and construction of the variables used to explain 
the variation in bank capital structure. 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
2.2. Partial Adjustment Model 
We follow common practice in the empirical capital structure literature and model 
leverage using a partial adjustment framework. In a frictionless world, banks would always 
maintain their target capital ratio. However, if adjustment costs are significant, the bank’s 
decision to adjust its capital structure depends on the trade-off between the adjustment costs and 
the costs of operating with suboptimal leverage (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). In a partial 
adjustment model, a bank’s current capital ratio, 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡, is a weighted average (with weight 
𝜆 𝜖 [0,1]) of its target capital ratio, 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ , and the previous period’s capital ratio, 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, as well 
as a random shock, 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡: 
(1) 
𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡.  
Each year, the typical bank closes a proportion 𝜆  of the gap between its actual and target 
capital levels. The smaller the lambda, the more rigid bank capital is, and the longer it takes for a 
bank to return to its target after a shock to bank capital. Thus, we can interpret 𝜆 as the speed of 
adjustment and its complement (1 − 𝜆) as the portion of capital that is inertial.  
Banks’ target capital ratio is unobserved and is not necessarily constant over time. We 
model each bank’s target level of bank capital as a function of observed (lagged) bank and 
country characteristics, 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. We follow the recent literature on the selection of the variables 
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that determine leverage targets. Brewer, Kaufman, and Wall (2008) and Gropp and Heider 




∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. 
 We also account for two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: bank fixed effects (which 
subsume country fixed effects) and year fixed effects. Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Gropp and Heider (2010) advocate the 
importance of including firm (bank) dummies for an unbiased estimation of targets. 
Substituting the equation of target leverage, equation (2), in equation (1) yields the 
following specification:  
(3) 
𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡. 
 In the presence of a lagged dependent variable and a short panel, using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or a standard fixed effects model would yield biased estimates of the adjustment 
speed. Therefore, following Flannery and Hankins (2013), we estimate equation (3) using 
Blundell and Bond's (1998) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.  
2.3. Initial Findings 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics on the bank- and country-level variables. Table 2, 
Panel A, lists summary statistics on the book equity-to-asset ratio.8 The average equity-to-asset 
                                                          
7 See Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011) for a recent study that incorporates country-level characteristics into the 
traditional set of determinants to explain a firm’s leverage. 
8 We prefer book leverage to market leverage because restricting the sample to listed banks substantially biases the 
sample toward the largest banks. Moreover, the decision to be listed could be affected by the country characteristics 
we investigate. In addition, we use a simple leverage ratio rather than the regulatory capital ratio because it enables 
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ratio over all banks and periods is 10%. With regard to the first finding, a variance 
decomposition analysis confirms that the fraction of the total variation in banks’ capital ratios 
due to time-invariant bank characteristics (bank fixed effects) is 85%, in line with Lemmon et al. 
(2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010). 
<Insert Table 2 around here> 
Regarding our second aim, that is, to assess whether the reliably important factors of 
corporate leverage also explain bank leverage, we report the coefficient estimates and the 
significance levels of the country-specific (Panel B) and bank-specific (Panel C) drivers9 of the 
target capital ratios [from the estimation of equation (3)] in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2. Smaller, 
more profitable, and cost-efficient banks have higher capital ratios. Lower credit risk and higher 
price inflation induce banks to hold less capital. We consider these variables the banking 
counterparts of the set of firm-specific factors that Frank and Goyal (2009) and Öztekin 
(forthcoming) label “reliably important” for corporate capital structure of U.S. and international 
firms. Gropp and Heider (2010) also confirm these variables for a sample of large U.S. and 
European banks. In addition to these standard factors, we find significant associations of other 
bank and country characteristics [loans to total assets (–) and ln(Total assets/gross domestic 
product) (+)] [capital stringency (–), deposit insurance coverage (+), multiple supervisors (–), 
gross domestic product [GDP] per capita growth (–), stock market capitalization (+), and 
systemic stability (+)] with capital structure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ready comparison with a plethora of corporate leverage studies. Furthermore, plain leverage is an important 
component in the new capital adequacy guidelines of Basel III. 
 
9 To conserve space, we do not discuss the summary statistics, which are comparable to those of previous studies 
such as Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013). 
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In unreported tests, we evaluate the sensitivity of the target capital ratio to potential 
model misspecifications that could arise from omitted bank- or country-specific variables. The 
miscategorization of targets when bank characteristics are ignored is trivial as long as bank fixed 
effects are included. Ignoring the variation in the targets created by country characteristics is 
even less harmful than ignoring within-bank variation. Overall, model misspecification due to 
omitted bank or country characteristics seems to have little or no effect on the estimated targets. 
Using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM estimator and allowing variation in the target 
due to bank and country characteristics as well as firm and year fixed effects, we find that the 
estimated speed of adjustment (λ) is 0.29 for our worldwide sample of banks. A speed of 
adjustment parameter of 0.29 implies that the adjustment to bank target leverage is partial and 
that half the gap between the actual and the target capital ratio is closed in two years. We 
compute the half-life as log(0.5)/log(1 – speed of adjustment). This point estimate is in the range 
obtained for corporations (0.25 for U.S. firms in Lemmon et al. (2008), and 0.21 for corporations 
worldwide in Oztekin and Flannery (2012), both of which use system GMM) and large banks 
(0.40 for U.S. banks in Berger et al. (2008), using system GMM, and 0.47 for banks in the 
United States and 15 European countries in Gropp and Heider (2010), using fixed-effects 
regressions). 
We also estimate the partial adjustment model [Equation (3)] on a country-by-country 
basis. Using a large global database and a uniform methodology for all countries, we find that the 
estimated bank adjustment speeds vary considerably across countries. Figure 1 depicts the 
11 
 
heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment of bank capital across 64 countries using harmonized 
data, a similar methodology, and a common period.10 
<Insert Figure 1 around here> 
The average adjustment speed across countries, based on a country-by-country 
estimation, is 29.7% (which is in line with the pooled full sample estimate of 29%). The standard 
deviation of the 64 country-specific estimates is 15%, with a minimum of 0.01% in Colombia 
and a maximum of 74% in Panama. Moreover, 90% of the mass of the distribution lies in the 
interval of 10%–52% (5th and 95th percentiles, respectively). Germany and the United Kingdom 
have adjustment speeds below 20%, while the United States (34%) is slightly above average. In 
the Netherlands and Denmark, the adjustment speed exceeds 35%. Thus, the differences in the 
estimates are not purely driven by a developed versus developing country distinction. For 
example, a significant dispersion in the adjustment speed estimates occurs even among the G7 
countries (13% in France and 34% in United States). The economic magnitude of this dispersion 
is large. On average, the half-life is 2 years. However, the half-life is 4.26 (1.15) years in 
countries in which the speed of adjustment is one standard deviation below (above) than the 
average. Thus, our data confirm that the adjustment to their target leverage is partial and 
heterogeneous for a worldwide sample of banks. 
Some studies find that the estimation of equation (3) could generate evidence in favor of 
rebalancing toward a target even with random financing (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta (2009), 
                                                          
10 Studies on corporate capital structure often use partial adjustment models in a single-country setup. Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012) are the first to compare firms’ capital structure adjustments across countries in a uniform setting. 
Their sample consists of all nonfinancial firms in the COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database from 37 countries 




Hovakimian and Li (2011)). These studies argue that tests based on the financing behaviour 
(rather than leverage changes only) have the power to reject alternatives. Our data would lend 
support to the power of a partial adjustment specification of capital ratios if rebalancing activities 
are actually reflected in bank balance sheets and adjustment speeds vary plausibly with 
macroeconomic and regulatory variables. We investigate both issues in Section 3 and Section 4, 
respectively. 
 
3. Capital Structure Adjustments of Banks 
If banks make adjustments when there is a wedge between the target and the actual 
capital ratio, hereinafter called “the gap” and defined as 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑗,𝑡−1= 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ − 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, these 
adjustments should be reflected in their observed balance sheet transactions. In this section, we 
investigate how banks adjust their capital structure to close their deviation from the target. We 
evaluate the percentage growth rates in various balance sheet components for three quintiles of 
the gap. To do this, we first allocate banks to quintiles based on their gap at the end of year. 
Subsequently, we compute the yearly change in the relevant variable in the following year. We 
then average these growth rates across all bank-year observations in that quintile. We present our 
results for the overall sample (Section 3.1) as well as subsamples of bank size and type (Sections 
3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively). We also discuss some robustness tests on the target estimation in 
Section 3.3. 
3.1. Main results 
 First, we report the results for the overall sample in Table 3. The first column documents 
the mean values of the balance sheet components (scaled by total assets, total liabilities, and total 
equity in Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D, respectively) in the overall sample to assess the 
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economic significance of our results. The second column corresponds to the first quintile and 
represents overcapitalized banks with a negative gap. The third column represents banks with a 
negligible gap. The fourth column corresponds to the fifth quintile and represents 
undercapitalized banks with a positive gap. On average, the difference between an 
overcapitalized (undercapitalized) bank’s capital ratio and its target, defined as 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑗,𝑡−1= 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ − 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, is -5% (4%). In columns 5 and 6, we report the p-values of 
difference in means tests using the middle quintile (banks close to their target) as the benchmark. 
<Insert Table 3 around here> 
Table 3, Panel A, contains information on capital ratio changes. First, we focus on the 
adjustments made by overcapitalized banks, which should reduce their capital ratio to arrive at 
their target. The growth rate of the capital ratio for overcapitalized banks is significantly negative 
(-10.98%), consistent with the conjecture that bank managers make proactive efforts to converge 
to their target. In this quintile, the growth in bank equity is almost zero, while the asset growth is 
large (11.31%) and significantly exceeds the 4.27% growth rate of the middle quintile. Thus, 
leveraging takes place by means of an aggressive asset expansion strategy and a slower-than-
average equity growth (but not a reduction in the capital base). 
What are the channels through which this leveraging takes place? If banks expand, do 
they lend aggressively, or do they hoard cash or invest in securities? Is the expansion in bank 
size financed by retail or wholesale funding? To address these questions, we examine various 
subcomponents of bank assets and liabilities in Table 3, Panels B and C, respectively. The results 
in Panel B indicate that when banks are overcapitalized, they expand all components of the asset 
side of the balance sheet. This expansion is roughly similar for loans (10.47%) and other earning 
assets (9.68%) but is considerably larger for nonearning assets (15%). The starting ratio of non-
14 
 
earning assets to total assets is 6% on average, indicating that this growth rate is not trivial in 
economic terms. Thus, banks that need to lever up tend to hoard more of the additional deposits 
they raise as nonearning assets, of which more than half is cash (for the median bank).11 Not 
surprisingly, not much variation exists in the growth of fixed assets, though the growth rate is 
slightly higher than the middle group. The low to moderate growth in fixed assets is also an 
indication that asset expansion is most often realized without involvement in a large merger and 
acquisition (M&A). A large M&A transaction would lead to substantial growth in property and 
other fixed assets in the early stage of the acquisition because divestitures only occur when 
restructuring the newly merged entity. The results in Panel C indicate that retail (demand and 
savings deposits) and wholesale funding (interbank funding and large time deposits) sources play 
an equally important role in the financing of the expansion in the overcapitalized banks.12 The 
numbers and patterns are similar for both sources of funding and indicate a substantially higher 
growth rate in both core deposits and other sources of funding. 
 Second, we investigate the adjustments made by undercapitalized banks that need to 
increase their capital ratio to reach their target. The growth rate of the capital ratio for 
undercapitalized banks is significantly positive (8.48%), implying that bank managers actively 
rebalance their capital structure to converge to their target. How does this deleveraging take 
place? It may be more cost-efficient for banks to improve their capital ratios through asset 
reduction rather than capital injection if raising new capital is costly. However, the extent to 
which banks can shrink their assets depends on the number of assets maturing in the current 
                                                          
11 The larger growth of non-earning assets vis-à-vis loans suggests that banks pursue a conservative rather than an 
aggressive loan strategy. 
12 The deposit (both retail and wholesale) growth difference between undercapitalized and ‘on target’ banks is 
statistically significant but economically small.  
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period and the capital losses that might result from selling off illiquid, nonmaturing assets. We 
observe a combination of asset liquidation and recapitalization. In the fifth quintile of the gap, 
asset growth is significantly lower (3.68% vs. 4.27%), but equity growth is significantly higher 
(11.66% vs. 4.81%) than the middle (banks close to their target) quintile. In other words, most of 
the increase in the capital ratio is realized by recapitalizing rather than downsizing the bank. 
 How does this recapitalization occur? Do banks manage their capital ratios mostly using 
external funds, or do they mainly rely on internal funds? To shed light on this issue, we 
distinguish between internal and external sources of capital and report the results in Table 3, 
Panel D. External capital is the outcome of issuances and/or repurchases of preference and/or 
common shares. Internal capital denotes changes in retained earnings, minority interests, and 
other equity reserves13 and constitutes a cheaper and steadier source of bank financing. The 
results indicate that undercapitalized banks mainly use equity issuances to recapitalize. Although 
both internal and external capital contributes to equity growth, the economic impact is higher 
with the latter. The increase in undercapitalized banks’ capital ratio is 5.2 times larger than the 
middle quintile with external capital (12.54% vs. 2.40%) and only 1.3 times greater with internal 
capital (8.60% vs. 6.42%).14  
                                                          
13 Due to data limitations, we are not able to single out retained earnings for all banks. Therefore, we use ‘total 
equity reserves’ as our proxy for internal capital. This includes retained earnings, minority interests, and other equity 
reserves. However, for those banks that report the breakdown of total equity reserves (which constitutes 75% of the 
sample), on average, 94 per cent of total equity reserves are due to retained earnings.  
14 Due to missing data, we refrain from incorporating dividend distributions to our main analysis. However, in 
unreported tests conducted in the limited sample, we observe that banks do not cut back on dividends when they 
need to raise equity. However, when they are overcapitalized and must increase their leverage, they tend to 
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3.2.  Subsample results 
 Our finding that undercapitalized banks do not primarily adjust by selling assets is 
important because regulators are concerned that large-scale asset sales might induce a crisis. 
(Unexpected) Sales of assets in large amounts may temporarily depress their market prices and 
hence lead to contagious effects on the value of the balance sheet of other banks. Moreover, in a 
fair-value accounting framework, it may lead to a decrease in capital at other banks, potentially 
leading to further (fire) sales of assets. As such, it could be a major source of financial instability, 
especially at larger banks that tend to hold a larger proportion of marketable assets. To assess 
whether asset sales might be a threat to the financial system stability when banks need to de-
lever, we examine capital structure adjustment patterns for a variety of bank size categories and 
report the results in Table 4. Furthermore, mutual institutions may differ sharply from 
shareholder-owned institutions in terms of their mechanisms for making leverage adjustments.  
In particular, cooperative banks and saving banks should make most of their adjustments via 
asset size since they are not-for-profit institutions that cannot issue shares. To be able to draw 
generalizations about shareholder- vs. depositor-based institutions, we examine capital structure 
adjustment patterns for a variety of bank type categories and report the results in Table 5. Since 
our focus here is on the asset sales and equity adjustments, for brevity, we only document 
information for these variables (i.e. information corresponding to Panels A and D of Table 3).  
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 around here> 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
distribute larger dividends more than the middle quintile (5.40% vs. 1.53%). Data on share repurchases is not 
available in Bankscope. 
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3.2.1. Sample splits based on size 
In table 4, we split the sample in four quartiles based on total assets. The cutoff values of 
the quintiles are 105, 300, and 1000 US$ million, respectively. In addition, we also look at the 
subsample of banks in the top 5 per cent of the asset distribution (total assets in excess of US$ 13 
billion). The patterns on asset and equity growth mimic our original results documented in Panel 
A of Table 3. Important to note is that, for the very large banks (i.e. fourth quartile and top 5 per 
cent), asset growth of undercapitalized banks (6.70% for Q4 and 7.44% for the top 5%) and 
banks close to target (6.38% for Q4 and 7.43% for top 5%) is not significantly different. 
However, for banks in the first three quartiles of the size distribution, the difference in asset 
growth of undercapitalized banks and banks that are near target is statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the (forced) sale (or slower expansion) of real assets in smaller banks is likely 
driven by their lower external financing capacity: the growth rate of external equity is only 
7.55% for small banks (Q1) when undercapitalized but over 16% for larger banks (Q4 and the 
top 5%). In general, when banks are undercapitalized, we find that the scope for external 
financing adjustments increases with bank size, which prevents large banks from having to sell 
assets. Another important difference across small and large banks is that smaller banks (below 
the median size) do not (or cannot) rely on internal financing to make capital structure 
adjustments.15 Internal capital growth of smaller banks is not statistically different across 
quintiles of the gap. Finally, the differences in the asset growth rates across bank size subsamples 
are negligible when banks are overcapitalized.  
                                                          
15 This finding is consistent with Smirlock (1985) who documents a positive and significant relationship between 
bank size and profitability, suggesting a role for economies of scale in banking.  
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In sum, these results are informative and assuring for policymakers seeking to tackle 
systemic risk. We find that the smaller institutions are more prone to rely on fire sales for de-
levering, whereas undercapitalized large banks’ assets continue to grow. Since smaller banks 
have lower leverage and are less connected, their fire sales are not likely to be a de-stabilizing 
mechanism when banks need to de-lever.   
3.2.2. Sample splits based on bank type 
In Table 5, we expand our analysis to separate out several types of banks (commercial 
banks, mutual institutions, and bank holding companies). For brevity, in each subcategory, we 
focus on the extreme quintiles of the gap (i.e. quintiles 1 and 5). In addition, we take the 
commercial bank subsample as the benchmark and compare the capital management patterns of 
the mutual institutions (i.e. savings and cooperative banks) and bank holding companies in each 
quintile with that of the commercial banks.  
We include Bank Holding Companies in our main sample for a number of reasons. First, 
they are the ultimate owners and capital management generally takes place at the consolidated 
level. Hence excluding them from the sample could lead to biased and misguided conclusions on 
banks' mix between internal and external sources of capital. A second reason is related to the 
classification and labelling of Bankscope. What Bankscope classifies as Bank Holding 
companies are not only the U.S. BHCs, but also Universal Banks operating in Europe or Asia. A 
more appropriate labelling (by Bankscope) would perhaps be financial conglomerates (with a 
banking focus). Thirdly, this sampling strategy also permits ready comparison with existing 
studies (see e.g. Gropp and Heider (2010)). By isolating BHCs from commercial banks, we now 
explore the extent to which they differ in terms of capital management. BHCs exhibit similar 
capital ratio growth rates as banks, regardless of whether they are over- or undercapitalized (the 
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capital ratio growth rates across undercapitalized BHCs and undercapitalized banks are 
statistically different, but are close in economic magnitude). The main disparity between banks 
and BHCs is the more pronounced differences in asset growth between over- and 
undercapitalized for the former (12.95% when overcapitalized and 3.55% when undercapitalized 
for banks vs. 8.96% when overcapitalized and 6.02% when undercapitalized for the BHCs). In 
addition, in contrast to the commercial banks, BHCs seem to heavily rely on internal capital to 
make adjustments: in the BHC subsample, the growth rate differential between quintiles 1 and 5 
is more than 14%, whereas among the commercial banks, the growth in internal capital is similar 
whether they are overcapitalized (7%) or undercapitalized (8.4%).  
Capital management decisions of the mutual institutions differ from that of the 
commercial banks as well. For the mutual institutions, the growth rates of the capital ratio are 
smaller (in absolute value) compared to commercial banks, both for the over- and 
undercapitalized. The more moderate growth of the capital ratio for undercapitalized mutual 
institutions (compared to commercials) is mainly due to lower asset growth, whereas the more 
moderate growth when overcapitalized is mainly due to lower equity growth. Furthermore, in the 
mutual institution subsample, the growth rate of internal capital is significantly different for the 
over- versus underlevered (-1.8% vs. 6.37%), whereas it is not the case for commercial banks (p-
value of 0.21). However, consistent with their business strategy, external capital is not (cannot 
be) used by mutual institutions to manage bank capital as their respective growth rates do not 
differ in the extreme quintiles (p-value of 0.24), while the opposite is true for the commercial 
banks, which extensively rely on external capital (2.32% vs. 13.15%) Hence, commercial banks 
benefit more from the additional flexibility of raising internal capital to get back to their target 
more quickly.  
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An important caveat is that these are univariate sample splits. Hence, attributing 
similarities or differences in results purely to bank types may be incorrect, especially since BHCs 
are on average larger than the commercial banks. The observed differences between BHCs and 
banks (in terms of asset growth and internal capital adjustments) are consistent with the results 
reported in the size-based sample splits, which makes it difficult to attribute the findings to a size 
or a type effect. 
3.3. Robustness on the target 
In unreported tests, we conduct additional analyses using a variety of alternative target 
estimation techniques to ensure that our model specification does not drive the results. First, we 
estimate a regression that includes the lagged dependent variable, bank fixed effects, and time 
fixed effects [equation (3) without bank-specific and country-specific controls]. Second, we run a 
static regression [equation (3) with the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable]. Finally, we 
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional leverage regressions estimated annually. Our 
main conclusions largely hold regardless of how we specify the target estimation model.  
 
4. Sources of Cross-Country Variation in Banks’ Speed of Adjustment   
In Section 2.3, we document significant heterogeneity in the country-level adjustment speeds 
of banks. In this section, our goal is to uncover the sources of this heterogeneity. More 
specifically, we assess the following question: What factors lead to cross-country differences in 
the speed of adjustment? We first introduce the testable hypotheses. Next, we discuss the 




 In Section 3, we examine various balance sheet mechanisms through which banks alter 
their capital ratio to achieve their long-term desired level. These actions necessitate either 
external financing (new security issues) or financial flexibility (cash slack or internal capital). To 
the extent that the bank’s environment is more conducive to easy access to capital markets or 
greater financial flexibility, altering the capital ratio to revert to the target becomes less 
burdensome, implying faster adjustment. Therefore, the speed at which bank managers reverse 
the deviations from their optimal capital ratio varies with the costs as well as the benefits of 
adjusting the leverage. The testable hypotheses are summarized in Table 6 and discussed in more 
detail below.  
<Insert Table 6 around here> 
We divide adjustment costs into two components: (1) the costs of external financing and (2) the 
extent to which banks’ financial flexibility is constrained by various factors. According to the 
first component, higher costs of external financing should result in slower adjustment for three 
reasons. First, the owners of a highly levered firm transfer value to fixed income claimants when 
they raise new equity, as in the classic “debt overhang” situation (Myers (1977)). However, 
bank-specific regulation may limit the scope of risk shifting related to agency problems. Banks 
that are subject to stricter capital requirements should be perceived as being less risky, all else 
equal, as their capital holdings are risk-based and the sources of capital are verified by 
supervisory authorities (and are thus an effective external disciplining mechanism on self-
interested managers and shareholders). This, in turn, lowers the agency cost between 
shareholders and debtholders and beneficially affects the price and/or availability of debt and 




Second, information asymmetries between bank managers and investors could negatively 
affect capital structure rebalancing by creating a wedge between internal and external financing 
costs (Myers (1984), (2003) and Myers and Majluf (1984)). Information asymmetries about 
banks’ financial health can be relieved by supervisory and private monitoring. Better supervision 
should make it easier for investors to understand (and hence to value) banks. A higher level of 
regulatory governance as indicated by the multiple supervisors variable should lead to faster 
capital adjustments if the market perceives the greater supervisory discipline as effective. In 
addition, stronger external governance enables market participants to assess the risk profile and 
capital adequacy of the bank more efficiently. Therefore, this form of private monitoring 
(directly imposed by rating agencies and auditors, or indirectly imposed by stronger accounting 
standards) should also be associated with lower external financing costs and faster adjustment. 
Third, raising equity by selling new shares may entail significant transaction costs or 
share price reductions. If access to capital markets is easier, banks can repeatedly adjust their 
equity to reach their target capital ratio, rather than waiting until access becomes available or 
relatively cheaper. Accordingly, higher stock market development should facilitate bank access 
to capital, leading to lower transaction costs and faster adjustment. 
According to the second component, the costs of adjustment are partly determined by the 
degree to which regulatory and market conditions constrain banks’ financial flexibility. On the 
one hand, regulatory limitations on banks’ permissible range of activities may curb their profit 
opportunities and adversely affect their performance and financial flexibility (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004)). The variable activity restrictions captures the severity of regulatory constraints 
that impede banks’ ability to engage in non-traditional banking activities (e.g., insurance, 
underwriting, real estate activities) that could generate significant fee income and pump up bank 
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earnings (Rice and DeYoung (2004) and Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007)). Lower 
profits could render cash management and earning retention more difficult, meaning that less 
financial slack will be available to conduct capital structure adjustments. More restrictions 
should lead to slower adjustment.16 On the other hand, banks should be able to make faster 
adjustments toward their target leverage in macroeconomic states that increase bank profitability 
and create more financial flexibility. Since bank profitability increases during economic 
expansions and inflationary periods (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)), we expect a positive 
impact of GDP per capita growth and inflation on the speed of adjustment. 
The speed of rebalancing should also depend on the benefits of adjustment. Convergence 
to the target is most valuable in regulatory settings in which financial distress is more likely (and 
costly) or the risks of bank insolvencies tend to be more important. First, the odds of bank 
insolvencies are substantially greater in times of financial crises, leading to higher adjustment 
benefits for surviving incumbent banks (Perotti and Suarez, 2002) and, in turn, to faster 
adjustment. We obtain crisis episodes from the systemic banking crisis database constructed by 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) and analyze whether adjustment speeds differ in crisis and normal 
times. Second, regulators have more incentives to bail out banks if default is systemic rather than 
idiosyncratic (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)). Thus, higher values of the systemic stability 
variable should be associated with faster adjustments because regulatory decisions are less likely 
to suffer from the “too-many-to-fail” belief. Third, on the one hand, the possibility of a bank run 
                                                          
16 The proxies we adopt should not be interpreted narrowly. For instance, greater activity restrictions may both limit 
profitability of the banks and decrease the volatility of their earning streams, in which case not only the adjustment 
costs would increase, but the adjustment benefits would decrease as well. Furthermore, allowing banks to engage in 
arm’s length, transaction-based, and hence more flexible or scalable non-traditional banking activities such as 
trading and securitization may facilitate capital structure adjustments via the denominator.  
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(depositor discipline) is substantially lower in countries in which the regulatory framework 
provides substantial deposit insurance coverage to depositors, leading to smaller adjustment 
benefits and, in turn, slower adjustment. On the other hand, deposit insurance may reduce the 
debt overhang problem and/or create banking system instability (Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002), leading to a potentially swifter adjustment towards target.   
4.2. Empirical Methodology 
To test these hypotheses, we modify the empirical setup described in Section 2.2 and 
adjust the model such that the adjustment speed, λ, can vary over time, banks, and countries: 
(4) 
𝜆𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 
where Λ is a vector of coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zi,j,t−1 is a set of 
covariates that could affect the adjustment speed. Substituting equation (4) in equation (3) yields 
the equation for a partial adjustment model with heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment: 
(5) 
∆𝐾𝑖𝑗.𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)(𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
To explore which factors are related to the observed cross-country differences in the 
adjustment speeds, we follow Berger et al. (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) and estimate 
equation (5) in two steps. In the first step, we estimate equation (3) country by country using 
system GMM and obtain an estimate of target capital ratio using equation (2). The country-by-
country estimation permits heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates of the determinants of bank 
capital ratios across countries. Using the results from the first step, we calculate each bank’s 
deviation from its (estimated) target capital ratio, which we label 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1, and substitute this 
estimated gap in equation (5) to obtain the following: 
(6) 
∆𝐾𝑖𝑗.𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
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 This second step involves a pooled OLS regression of the dependent variable on a set of 
variables defined as the product of 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 and the aforementioned covariates affecting the 
adjustment speed. The vector of estimated coefficients allows us to test various hypotheses on 
the determinants of the adjustment speed. To ease economic interpretation, we standardize the 
independent variables before interacting them with 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. Hence, the coefficient 𝜆0 can be 
interpreted as the average speed of adjustment in the sample. We cluster the standard errors at 
the country-year level, allowing the residuals to be correlated among the same banks in a given 
country in a given year (alternative clustering methods yield less conservative standard errors).17  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Baseline Results 
 Table 7 reports regression results for the country-level determinants of the adjustment 
speeds. Column 1 illustrates the results of our baseline specification. 
<Insert Table 7 around here> 
We find significant influence of the regulatory, supervisory, and macroeconomic 
framework on bank adjustment speeds. First, we find support for the three hypotheses related to 
the cost of external financing. Countries that are one standard deviation above the mean of the 
Capital Stringency index adjust significantly faster (0.030). A more stringent capital ratio 
requirement induces a result that is intended – a reduction in agency costs, an increase in the 
probability of a desirable portfolio adjustment behavior, and consequently faster adjustment. A 
one standard deviation increase in the multiple supervisors variable leads to an increase in the 
                                                          
17 Our inferences are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged when we bootstrap the standard errors, indicating 
that the potential bias caused by the generated regressor (𝐺𝐴𝑃) is inconsequential in our sample. Since bootstrapping 
is computationally intensive, we choose to report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level.  
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average adjustment speed of 0.037, indicating that the market perceives the greater supervisory 
discipline as effective in mitigating the information asymmetry costs. Whereas having multiple 
supervisors positively affects the adjustment speed, external governance reverses approximately 
half this increase (–0.020) and therefore has adverse effects on capital adjustments, raising the 
possibility that public and private information gathering and supervision are substitute 
mechanisms for each other. Alternatively, the direct costs associated with private monitoring 
(e.g., compulsory external audit by a licensed auditor, rating by an international credit rating 
agency) more than outweigh the (disciplinary) benefits of adjustment. These findings raise a 
cautionary flag regarding reform strategies that place excessive reliance on the private-sector 
monitoring and supervision of banks to alleviate the information asymmetry costs. In addition, 
well-developed stock markets result in faster adjustment (0.029) by reducing external financing 
costs and increasing the ability to raise capital. These effects are statistically significant and 
economically sizable. For example, a one standard deviation increase in multiple supervisors 
increases the average speed of adjustment by 0.037 (compared to a baseline adjustment speed, 
𝜆0̂, of 0.247) and explains 25% of the observed cross-country standard deviation in the speed of 
adjustment (recall from Figure 1 that the cross-country standard deviation in the speed of 
adjustment is 0.15).  
Second, we find partial support for the hypothesis related to the benefits of financial 
flexibility. Activity restrictions and GDP per capita growth do not have statistically significant 
effects on the adjustment speed. On the other hand, inflation “greases the wheels” of adjustments 
(0.111) similar to many other economic problems (e.g., the labor market and wage flexibility as 
in Tobin (1972) and Groshen and Schweitzer (1999)). This effect has a significant economic 
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impact: a one standard deviation change in the inflation variable corresponds to almost 70% of 
the observed cross-country dispersion in the adjustment speeds.  
Third, we find only partial support for the hypothesis regarding the disciplining effect of 
the insolvency risk and financial distress. Only one out of three variables related to this 
hypothesis is significant. Systemic stability does not have a statistically significant impact on 
capital structure adjustments. However, the adjustment benefits are higher and the adjustment 
speed is significantly faster (0.115) in times of crisis, explaining about 70% of the observed 
cross-country dispersion. Finally, the deposit insurance coverage loads with a negative sign. 
However, its impact on the speed of adjustment is statistically and economically insignificant, 
possibly because of the opposing effects of lower depositor discipline on the hand and less debt 
overhang problems on the other hand. 
In terms of broad policy implications, our findings are consistent with the view that 
regulations that impose higher capital standards and public supervisory practices that promote 
accurate information disclosure work best to assist banks in conducting their desired capital 
structure changes. Regulatory practices that limit activity restrictions and deposit insurance 
coverage to enhance stability and protect depositors do not seem to have an effect on bank 
capital adjustments. 
4.3.2. Robustness 
We conduct many sensitivity analyses on our baseline results. Specifically, we rerun our 
results with an alternative estimation methodology (weighted least squares); conduct sample 
splits with respect to bank type (commercial banks only), pace of asset growth, and time period 
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(crisis, no crisis); and employ an alternative definition of the capital ratios. We document our 
findings in columns 2-6 of Table 7.18  
In column 2, we test the impact of the dominance of U.S. banks and other large countries 
in our sample. We rerun our estimation with weighted least squares in which weights are 
proportional to the inverse number of observations in each country. Our results are largely 
similar. One notable difference is that the variable stock market capitalization is insignificant, 
while GDP per capita is significant and has the expected positive sign. In addition, the variable 
activity restrictions becomes highly significant, while it is borderline insignificant (with the 
expected negative sign) in the setup without sample weights.  
In column 3, we analyze the subsample of commercial banks, which constitute 61% of 
the entire sample. Eliminating the bank holding companies, cooperative banks, and savings 
banks does not affect the results, except for external governance, which  is borderline significant 
in the baseline and which now becomes insignificant at the conventional significance levels.19 
External governance index, which captures information on financial statement transparency, 
external audits, and bank ratings, may matter less for banks without publicly traded equity. 
                                                          
18 In addition to the results that we tabulate and describe in this subsection, we also confirm robustness to adding 
additional controls, namely, the interaction terms between the gap and (1) a quadratic inflation term, (2) the real 
interest rate, (3) the tax rate, (4) the marketwide price–earnings ratio, (5) bank-level variables, and (6) additional 
country characteristics (such as formal or informal institutions). For the sake of space, we do not report these tests.  
 
19 In additional (untabulated) results, we test whether the speed of adjustment differs across bank types, by adding 
bank type dummies to our baseline specification (column 1 of Table 7). We find that the speed of adjustment of 
mutual institutions (26.8% for cooperative banks and 28% for savings banks) is less than shareholder-owned 
institutions (31.2% for commercial banks and 32.4% for BHCs). 
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Therefore, we also analyze a subsample where we delete banks that have publicly traded equity. 
The (untabulated) results with non-listed banks (of any type) mimic the results of the commercial 
bank sample (as reported in column 3).  
In column 4, we drop bank observations with substantial changes in the growth of total 
assets to exclude M&As and divestitures. We define a substantial change in total assets as an 
annual growth less than –10% or greater than 15% (though alternative growth cutoffs lead to 
similar results). Our conclusions are unaffected, indicating that our results are not simply driven 
by M&As or divestitures.  
In column 5, we exclude systemic banking crisis episodes. Systemic banking crises 
comprise approximately 14% of the bank-year observations. Our baseline results (Table 7, 
column 1) continue to hold except for external governance. In unreported results, we restrict the 
sample to crisis times and find that the capital structure management is substantially different in 
a crisis. On the one hand do we find that during systemic banking crises, the adjustment speed is 
significantly faster (35.8% vs. 24.7%), which is consistent with our result reported in Table 7, 
column 1. On the other hand, none of the country characteristics seem to play a role for capital 
structure adjustments in crisis times, except for external governance, which substantially slows 
down (–13.3%) the adjustment speed.  
In column 6, we use the regulatory capital ratio, defined as Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets.20 Deposit insurance coverage does not affect the adjustment speeds using the 
simple capital ratio but significantly negatively affects the adjustment speeds using the 
                                                          
20 The proportion of banks that report both risk-weighted and plain leverage ratios varies substantially across 
countries. In unreported tests, we employ a Heckman selection model using a disclosure index (and other bank-level 
controls) as an instrument and obtain similar results. Moreover, an alternative definition of the regulatory capital 
ratio (the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital scaled by risk-weighted assets) leads to similar conclusions.  
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regulatory capital ratio. Stock market capitalization has opposite implications for the capital 
structure adjustments using the regulatory and simple capital ratios. Finally, capital stringency, 
external governance, and the crisis period do not have statistically significant influences on 
capital structure adjustments with the regulatory capital ratio. Are these differences due to a 
different dependent variable, or to a different set of observations? To find out, in unreported 
results, we examine the influences of the regulatory and macroeconomic attributes on the 
adjustment speeds using plain capital ratios for the subsample of banks for which we have 
information on both ratios. While capital stringency, external governance, stock market 
capitalization and crisis period lose their significance, deposit insurance coverage becomes 
significantly negative in the reduced sample using plain leverage ratio, indicating that the 
differences are due to the reduced sample size rather than the definition of the capital ratio. 
4.3.3. Asymmetric response to adjustment factors  
It is possible that the impact of the country-level variables on the adjustment speed 
depends on bank characteristics. To test this assertion, we rerun our baseline estimation 
[equation (6)], separately for quintiles based on the GAP and profitability and report the results 
in Table 8. For brevity, we specifically focus on the discrepancies in results across the quintiles 
of these bank-level variables because they enable us to fine-tune the empirical tests of the 
aforementioned hypotheses.  
<Insert Table 8 around here> 
The results based on the quintiles of the deviation from the target capital ratio indicate a 
strong and economically large difference between the speed of adjustment of banks that are 
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below and above target (20.3% and 30.6%, respectively).21 This is consistent with our earlier 
assessment of the capital structure adjustments in Section 3. Bank capital management critically 
depends on whether the bank is over- or undercapitalized, with overcapitalized banks achieving 
leveraging through asset expansion and earnings retention, and undercapitalized banks 
delevering using external capital and at a much slower pace. As expected, banks in the middle 
quintile do not seem to undertake corrective actions to their capital structure, as their deviation 
from the target is small (in either direction). The adjusted R-square of the regression for the 
middle quintile is close to zero, and bank’s environment does not matter for the speed of 
adjustment, which is reassuring. If the gap is small, the changes to capital structure should be due 
to random shocks rather than intended adjustments. Allowing for asymmetric response to the 
country-level characteristics based on the bank’s position relative to its target yields important 
insights. On the one hand, stock market capitalization (0.035***) and crisis periods (0.178***) 
facilitate capital structure adjustments only for undercapitalized banks. Higher stock market 
development reduces the cost of external financing, which is especially valuable for 
undercapitalized banks that must resort to external capital and crisis periods have a disciplining 
effect only among the undercapitalized banks. On the other hand, multiple supervisors (0.045***) 
and external governance (-0.019*) are only significant for overcapitalized banks consistent with 
the expectation that information asymmetry costs would be more prevalent with equity. 
The quintile results on bank profitability indicate that profitable banks can adjust more 
quickly during crisis periods (0.129***), possibly because they benefit more from the “last bank 
standing” effect of surviving incumbent banks (Perotti and Suarez (2002)). Profitable banks’ 
                                                          
21 The corporate finance literature documents a similar asymmetry for corporations (e.g., 19% vs. 41% in Warr, 
Elliott, Koeter-Kant, and Oztekin (2012)). 
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capital buffer can facilitate internal capital management (through higher retained earnings) and 
external capital management by inducing investors and/or supervisory authorities to provide 
financial support to sound banks during a crisis. The positive effect of stock market development 
on the adjustment speeds is significant except for the most profitable banks, plausibly because it 
is easier and cheaper for these banks to simply use their retained earnings rather than issue 
equity.  
In summary, many country-specific features have economically and statistically 
significant effects that prevail even after we control for asymmetric response to adjustment 
factors. The differences across quintiles observed in certain cases are consistent with the 
adjustment patterns documented in Section 3 and the underlying logic of our hypotheses on the 
determinants of bank adjustment speeds. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This article evaluates the regulatory, supervisory, and macroeconomic determinants of 
measured adjustment speeds in different countries, conditional on the partial adjustment model 
of capital structure. Using bank-level data from 64 countries spanning 17 years, we illustrate that 
the capital structure of a bank reflects not only its own characteristics but also the environment in 
which it operates.  
We contribute to the bank and capital structure literature streams in two ways. First, we 
investigate which balance sheet transactions banks choose to undertake if they need to alter their 
capital ratio to achieve the target level. Deleveraging is mainly achieved through external capital 
management rather than a substantial change in the asset base. In contrast, leveraging is 
accomplished through internal capital management, mainly through substantial asset expansion 
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and reduced earnings retention. Second, our partial adjustment statistical results show significant 
international variation in the speed of adjustment to target capital structure, varying from six 
months to cover half the distance to the target to near persistent effects of shocks. We tie this 
international variation in estimated adjustment speeds to differences in the regulatory, 
supervisory, and economic systems in which banks operate. Different environments impose 
different adjustment costs and benefits on firms, and we find that these differences are reflected 
in our estimated adjustment speeds. We also find that many country-specific features have 
economically and statistically significant effects that prevail even after we control for 
asymmetric response to adjustment factors and conduct various sample splits. The evidence that 
bank balance sheets reflect active rebalancing of capital ratios and that the estimates of 
adjustment speeds plausibly reflect country-specific features in our large international sample 
provides support for the applicability of a partial adjustment model of capital ratios to banks. 
 Our findings offer directions for further research and notable insights for policy makers. 
From an academic point of view, researchers aiming to embed a banking sector in a 
macroeconomic model with financial frictions should adequately control for supply-side factors 
of credit. We show in an international context that macroeconomic conditions affect bank capital 
dynamics and, thus, the resilience to or propagation of shocks. From a policy perspective, our 
results based on the simple leverage ratio (recently added to pillar I of Basel III) might be helpful 
in analyzing and fine-tuning the Basel III agreement. In general, Basel II and Basel III follow a 
one-size-fits-all countries approach. However, we show that country characteristics affect bank 
capital structure adjustments and hence a conditional or state-contingent policy may be more 
desirable. Our findings also shed some light on how the three pillars of the capital adequacy 
guidelines interact and influence bank capital structure management. Effective public monitoring 
34 
 
and supervision (emphasized by pillar II under supervisory review), on the one hand, and well-
functioning capital markets (stressed in pillar III under market discipline), on the other hand, 
positively affect the speed of adjustment toward target leverage (as implicitly targeted in pillar I 
under the capital requirements). However, external governance (another component of pillar III) 
has the opposite effect on bank capital structure adjustments. 
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Data Description, Source, and Construction 
Panel A contains information on the source and description of the country-specific regulatory and supervisory characteristics as well as the macroeconomic environment.  Panel B 
provides information on the bank-specific characteristics. For each bank-specific feature, we report how the variable (ratio) is constructed and the corresponding Bankscope item 
codes. 
Name Source Description
Activity Restrictions Bank regulation and supervision database - Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008) Degree to which banks can participate in various  non-interest 
income activities (e.g. insurance, real estate, underwriting, etc.)
Capital Stringency Bank regulation and supervision database - Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008) The strength of capital regulation in a country
Deposit Insurance Coverage Deposit insurance around the world database - Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) Deposit insurance coverage relative to GDP per capita
Multiple Supervisors Bank regulation and supervision database - Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008) Equals 1 if there are multiple bank supervisors, zero otherwise
External Governance Index Bank regulation and supervision database - Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008) The strength of external auditors, financial statement transparency, 
and the existence of an external rating
GDP per Capita Growth World Bank - World Development Indicators Annual percentage GDP per capita growth
Stock Market Capitalization World Bank - World Development Indicators Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)
Inflation World Bank - World Development Indicators Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Crisis Years Laeven and Valencia (2010) Equals 1 if the country experiences a systemic banking crisis in a 
given year, zero otherwise
Systemic Stability Bankscope, own calculations Z-score computed as the sum of aggregate profits and aggregate 
capital divided by the volatility of aggregate profits
Name Ratio Construction Corresponding Bankscope Item Codes
Capital Ratio Equity / Total Assets data2055 / data2025
ln(Total Assets) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (inflation adjusted, expressed in US dollars) ln(data2025)
Return on Average Assets Net Income/ (Total Assets(t) + Total Assets(t-1))/2 data4024 = data2115 / data2025AVG * 100
Cost to Income Ratio Overheads / (Net Interest Revenue + Other Operating Income) data4029 = data2090 / (data2080 + data2085) * 100
Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets / Deposits and short term funding data4035 = data2075 / data2030 * 100
Loan Loss Provisions Ratio Loan Loss Provisions / Net Interest Revenue data4002 = data2095 / data2080 * 100
Retail Funding Share Total Deposits / (Total Deposits + Total Money Market Funding) data6080 / (data6080 + data6160)
Loans to Total Assets Total Loans (Net) / Total Assets data5330 / data2025
Net Interest Income Share |Net Interest Rev.| / (|Net Interest Rev.|+|Total Operating Income - Net Interest Rev.|) |data6530| / (|data6530| + |data6640-data6530|)
Fixed Assets to Total Assets Fixed Assets / Total Assets data2015 / data2025
ln(Total Assets/GDP) ln(Total Assets/GDP), with GDP (constant 2000 US$) taken from WDI data2025/GDP
Panel A: Country-specific characteristics






The table presents summary statistics on three sets of variables. In panel A, we report information on the 
book equity-to-asset ratio. Panels B and C contain information on the country- and bank-specific 
characteristics, respectively. The definitions, units and the sources of the variables are provided in Table 1. In 
columns 1–5, we report the mean, standard deviation, fifth percentile, median, and 95th percentile for each 
variable. Columns 6 and 7 report the coefficients and standard errors (clustered at the country-year level) 
from the following partial adjustment model, where   is the adjustment parameter, X  is a set of bank and 
country characteristics, 𝐾 is the book equity ratio, and 𝜀 is a random-error term: 
Kij,t = λβXij,t−1 + (1 − λ)Kij,t−1 + εij,t. 
We estimate this equation for the full sample using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM estimator to mitigate 
the bias induced by including bank fixed effects in a model with a lagged dependent variable. The reported 
estimate for the capital ratio refers to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, (1 − λ). The 
unbalanced panel consists of a sample of 20,073 banks from 64 countries over the period 1994–2010, totaling 
154,065 bank-year observations. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicate 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Summary Statistics Mean Std. Dev 5% 50% 95% Std Errors
Capital Ratio 0.099 0.056 0.040 0.090 0.187 0.710
***
(0.022)
Activity Restrictions 9.453 2.311 5.000 10.000 13.000 0.036 (0.042)
Capital Stringency 5.751 1.797 3.000 6.000 9.000 -0.079
**
(0.031)
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.652 1.712 -1.661 -1.661 1.787 0.103
***
(0.030)
Multiple Supervisors 0.147 0.355 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.048
*
(0.029)
External Governance Index 13.131 1.915 10.000 13.200 16.000 -0.009 (0.033)
GDP per Capita Growth 2.579 3.379 -3.701 2.711 7.905 -0.149
***
(0.048)
Stock Market Capitalization 62.946 62.794 5.443 40.782 183.762 0.113
**
(0.054)
Inflation 5.574 7.710 0.164 3.277 15.928 -0.207
*
(0.110)
Systemic Stability 3.687 1.037 1.980 3.649 5.446 0.094
***
(0.016)
ln(Total Assets) 5.913 1.808 3.429 5.667 9.424 -1.984
**
(0.804)
Return on Average Assets 0.008 0.011 -0.006 0.007 0.022 0.171
***
(0.062)
Cost to Income Ratio 68.797 20.037 43.500 67.070 96.700 -0.090
*
(0.051)
Liquidity Ratio 17.439 21.326 2.500 10.790 58.140 -0.003 (0.099)
Loan Loss Provisions Ratio 13.207 22.407 0.000 6.760 49.230 0.074
**
(0.031)
Retail Funding Share 0.960 0.097 0.810 0.999 1.000 0.015 (0.061)
Loans to Total Assets 0.614 0.173 0.279 0.638 0.858 -0.598
***
(0.068)
Net Interest Income Share 0.779 0.154 0.461 0.811 0.956 -0.023 (0.050)
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.018 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.042 -0.109 (0.076)
In(Total Assets/GDP) -9.260 2.803 -12.728 -9.928 -3.693 0.884
**
(0.410)
Panel A: Equity-to-total assets ratio
Panel B: Country-specific characteristics






Growth in Bank Characteristics in Various Quintiles of the Capital Ratio Gap 
This table presents average growth rates of various bank-level variables: (1) variables directly related to the capital ratio in panel A, (2) the asset 
composition variables in panel B, (3) funding structure variables in panel C, and (4) variables related to (changes in) equity in panel D. We estimate the 
following reduced-form model of the capital ratio, where   is the adjustment parameter, X  is a set of bank and country characteristics, 𝐾 is the capital 
ratio, and 𝜀 is a random-error term: 
 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
We estimate this equation for the full sample using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM estimator to mitigate the bias induced by including bank fixed 
effects in a model with a lagged dependent variable. This estimation provides an initial set of estimated βs and λ, which we use to calculate an initial 
estimated target leverage ratio (𝐾ij,t
∗ = βXij,t−1) and deviation from the target leverage ratio (𝐺𝐴𝑃ij,t−1 =  Kij,t
∗ − Kij,t−1) for each bank-year. Column 1 
reports the mean values of the bank-level variables scaled by total assets, total liabilities, and total equity in panels B, C, and D, respectively. Columns 
2–4 report average yearly growth rates of the (unscaled) bank-level variables for three of five quintiles (bottom, middle, and top quintile) of the gap 
between the estimated target and lagged actual capital ratio (banks are allocated to quintiles based on the gap at time t-1 and growth is measured over the 
subsequent year, from t-1 to t).  The unbalanced panel consists of a sample of 20,073 banks from 64 countries over the period 1994–2010, totaling 
154,065 bank-year observations. We also report the number of observations per group (in parentheses), because not all variables are available for each 
bank. Columns 5 and 6 contain p-values of the pairwise t-tests of equality of means (with unequal variances) of the bottom and top group compared with 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Sample Quintile 1 Quintile 3 Quintile 5 Quintile 1 vs. 3 Quintile 3 vs. 5
Most Closest to Most
overcapitalized target undercapitalized
Mean
Gap -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
(30,982) (30,981) (30,981) *** ***
Equity to Total Assets -10.98 0.52 8.48 0.00 0.00
(30,982) (30,981) (30,981) *** ***
Equity 0.71 4.81 11.66 0.00 0.00
(30,982) (30,981) (30,981) *** ***
Total Assets 11.31 4.27 3.68 0.00 0.00
(30,982) (30,981) (30,981) *** ***
Loans 61.12 10.47 4.24 5.24 0.00 0.00
(30,868) (30,958) (30,688) *** ***
Other Earning Assets 30.42 9.68 2.81 -0.88 0.00 0.00
(30,829) (30,935) (30,915) *** ***
Non-Earning Assets 6.48 15.18 6.71 5.60 0.00 0.00
(30,963) (30,977) (30,941) *** ***
Fixed Assets 1.76 3.37 2.50 4.03 0.00 0.00
(30,643) (30,881) (30,500) *** ***
Demand and Savings Deposits 83.85 11.31 3.95 3.19 0.00 0.00
(26,177) (29,289) (26,568) *** ***
Other Funding 14.81 12.85 3.15 2.12 0.00 0.01
(26,161) (29,286) (26,557) *** ***
External Capital 60.42 3.15 2.40 12.54 0.00 0.00
(25,516) (23,815) (21,592) *** ***
Internal Capital 39.58 4.16 6.42 8.60 0.00 0.00
(24,015) (22,669) (20,278) *** ***
P-value/Significance
Panel B: Assets 
Panel C: Liabilities 
Panel D: Equity





Bank Capital Structure adjustments: Size-based sample splits 
This table presents average growth rates of the capital ratio, bank equity, total assets as well as sources of capital (internal versus external capital) in 
various quintiles of the capital ratio gap. Banks are allocated to quintiles based on the gap at time t-1 and growth is measured over the subsequent year, 
from t-1 to t. We report this information for five size-based sample splits: four quartiles based on total assets (of which the cutoff values are 105, 300, 
and 1000 US$ million, respectively) as well as the subsample of the 5 per cent largest banks in the sample (total assets in excess of US$ 13 billion). 
Each subpanel is constructed in a similar fashion and consists of three columns corresponding with three of five quintiles (bottom, middle, and top 
quintile) of the gap between the estimated target and lagged actual capital ratio. Quintile 1 corresponds with the most overcapitalized banks (largest 
negative gap), Quintile 3 banks are closest to their capital ratio target, whereas banks in quintile 5 are the most undercapitalized (largest positive gap). 
For each variable, we report the average growth rate, the number of observations per group (as not all variables are available for each bank, in 
parentheses) and the p-value of pairwise t-tests of equality of means (with unequal variances) of the extreme quintiles compared with the middle 




Q1 Q3 Q5 Q1 Q3 Q5 Q1 Q3 Q5 Q1 Q3 Q5 Q1 Q3 Q5
Equity to Total Assets -12.24 -0.23 7.95 -11.71 0.37 8.32 -10.43 0.83 8.34 -9.53 1.04 9.17 -8.16 0.90 9.38
(7,753) (7,753) (7,752) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (7,746) (7,745) (7,745) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (1,549) (1,548) (1,548)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Equity -0.59 2.04 7.18 1.01 4.41 10.66 0.86 6.10 12.33 2.04 7.43 15.35 3.21 8.36 16.49
(7,753) (7,753) (7,752) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (7,746) (7,745) (7,745) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (1,549) (1,548) (1,548)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Total Assets 11.54 2.24 -0.12 12.41 4.03 2.77 10.78 5.24 4.44 11.01 6.38 6.70 10.77 7.43 7.44
(7,753) (7,753) (7,752) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (7,746) (7,745) (7,745) (7,742) (7,741) (7,741) (1,549) (1,548) (1,548)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.98
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
External Capital 1.22 -0.41 7.55 3.83 1.19 11.19 3.96 3.74 14.72 4.52 6.84 16.13 3.24 7.16 16.75
(6,673) (7,256) (6,350) (6,495) (6,469) (5,606) (5,990) (5,073) (4,480) (6,219) (4,757) (5,436) (1,369) (1,287) (1,322)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Internal Capital 2.72 3.34 2.56 6.32 7.73 9.22 4.32 7.85 10.82 3.65 9.14 11.20 2.77 10.76 16.12
(6,241) (6,969) (5,987) (6,049) (6,105) (5,227) (5,586) (4,813) (4,164) (5,998) (4,563) (5,166) (1,350) (1,252) (1,291)
0.650 0.500 0.360 0.260 0.040 0.060 0.010 0.280 0.030 0.130
** * *** **
Quintile 1 (Q1) = Most overcapitalized; Quintile 3 (Q3) = Closest to Target; Quintile 5 (Q5) = Most Undercapitalized
Size (TA) Quartile 2 Size (TA) Quartile 3 Size (TA) Quartile 4 Size (TA) Top 5 percent
P-value/Significance P-value/Significance P-value/Significance P-value/Significance P-value/Significance
Size (TA) Quartile 1




Bank Capital Structure adjustments: Bank type sample splits 
This table presents average growth rates of the capital ratio, bank equity, total assets as well as sources of capital (internal versus external capital) in 
various quintiles of the capital ratio gap. Banks are allocated to quintiles based on the gap at time t-1 and growth is measured over the subsequent year, 
from t-1 to t. We report this information for three sample splits according to bank type: commercial banks, bank holding companies and mutual 
institutions (savings and cooperative banks). The first two columns in each subpanel correspond with the observations in the outer quintiles of the gap 
between the estimated target and lagged actual capital ratio. Quintile 1 corresponds with the most overcapitalized banks (largest negative gap), whereas 
banks in quintile 5 are the most undercapitalized (largest positive gap). For each variable, we report the average growth rate, the number of observations 
per group (as not all variables are available for each bank, in parentheses) and the p-value of pairwise t-tests of equality of means (with unequal 
variances) of the first and fifth quintiles. For the subsample of bank holding companies and the mutual institutions, we also report the p-value of a 
pairwise t-test of equality of means (with unequal variances) of a specific growth rate in a given quintile with the corresponding growth rate for 




Q 1 Q 5 Q 1 Q 5 Q1Comm=Q1BHC Q5Comm=Q5BHC Q 1 Q 5 Q1Comm=Q1Mutual Q5Comm=Q5Mutual
Equity to Total Assets -12.53 9.40 -12.01 8.06 0.14 0.00 -6.71 6.66 0.00 0.00
(19,333) (19,332) (2,986) (2,986) *** (8,663) (8,662) *** ***
0.00 0.00 0.00
*** ***
Equity 0.84 12.22 -2.42 13.77 0.00 0.00 1.71 9.87 *** ***
(19,333) (19,332) (2,986) (2,986) *** *** (8,663) (8,662)
0.00 0.00 0.00
*** ***
Total Assets 12.95 3.55 8.96 6.02 0.00 0.00 8.24 3.30 0.00 0.23
(19,333) (19,332) (2,986) (2,986) *** *** (8,663) (8,662) ***
0.00 0.00 0.00
*** ***
External Capital 2.32 13.15 0.17 13.89 0.00 0.37 7.60 8.52 0.00 0.00
(16,362) (15,926) (2,624) (2,586) *** (5,617) (3,298) *** ***
0.00 0.00 0.24
*** ***
Internal Capital 7.02 8.40 -2.02 12.23 0.00 0.00 -1.80 6.37 0.00 0.36
(15,826) (15,303) (2,612) (2,576) *** *** (4,380) (2,646) ***
0.21 0.00 0.00
*** ***
Quintile 1 (Q1) = Most overcapitalized; Quintile 5 (Q5) = Most Undercapitalized
Commercial BHCs Mutuals  
Mean / Obs /     
P-val (Q1=Q5) / 
Significance
Mean / Obs /    
P-val (Q1=Q5) 
/ Significance P-value/Significance
Mean / Obs /       








Predictions of the Impact of the Regulatory and Macroeconomic Variables on Bank Adjustment Speeds 
The table presents the major hypotheses tested. The definitions and the sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.  
Variable name Hypothesis Expected sign
A. Adjustment Cost Factors
A1. External financing costs
A1.1. Agency costs Lower agency costs result in lower external financing costs, which in turn lead to faster adjustment.
Capital stringency Capital regulations have a disciplining effect on bank managers, lowering the agency costs and leading to faster adjustment. +
A1.2. Information asymmetry costs Lower information asymmetry costs result in lower external financing costs, which in turn lead to faster adjustment.
Multiple supervisors Better supervision helps investors value banks more efficiently, reduces the information asymmetry costs, and leads to faster adjustment. +
External governance index Stronger external governance enables market participants to assess the risk profile and capital adequacy of the bank more efficiently, +
resulting in lower information asymmetry costs and thus faster adjustment.
A1.3. Ease of access Easier capital market access  results in lower external financing costs, which in turn lead to faster adjustment
Stock market capitalization Higher stock market development should facilitate bank access to capital, leading to lower transaction costs and faster adjustment. +
A2. Financial flexibility Greater financial flexibility facilitates capital structure adjustments, leading to faster adjustment.
Activity restrictions Restrictions on nontraditional banking activities that increase bank earnings lowers bank financial flexibility, leading to slower adjustment. -
GDP per capita growth Bank profitability increases during economic expansions, creating more financial flexibility, leading to faster adjustment. +
Inflation Bank profitability increases during inflationary periods, creating more financial flexibility, leading to faster adjustment. +
B. Adjustment Benefit Factors
Systemic stability Adjustment benefits are higher when the risks of bank insolvencies are more important, leading to faster adjustment. +
Crisis period The odds of bank insolvencies are  greater in crises times, leading to higher adjustment benefits and, in turn, faster adjustment. +
Deposit insurance coverage Bank runs are less likely due to deposit insurance coverage, leading to smaller adjustment benefits and, in turn, slower adjustment. -





Determinants of the Variation in the Speed of Adjustment 
The table provides information on the cross-country drivers of the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment. In the (unreported) 
first stage, we estimate the following reduced-form model of the capital ratio, where   is the adjustment parameter, X  is a set 
of bank characteristics, 𝐾 is the capital ratio, and 𝜀 is a random-error term: 
 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
We estimate this equation separately for each country using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM estimator to mitigate the bias 
induced by including bank fixed effects in a model with a lagged dependent variable. This estimation provides an initial set of 
estimated βs and λs, which we use to calculate an initial estimated target leverage ratio (𝐾ij,t
∗ = β𝑗Xij,t−1) and deviation from the 
target leverage ratio (𝐺𝐴𝑃ij,t−1 = Kij,t
∗ − Kij,t−1) for each bank-year. In the second stage, we substitute the estimated deviation 
from the target leverage ratio into the following equation to produce estimates of the determinants of bank adjustment speeds:  
  ∆𝐾𝑖𝑗.𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where Z is a vector of country characteristics and 𝜆0 and Λ are vectors of coefficients. Unless otherwise noted, we report the 
coefficient estimates from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The definitions and the sources of the variables are provided 
in Table 1. Column 1 documents the results for the equity-to-asset ratio using the entire sample. Column 2 reports the results 
using weighted least squares. The weights are inversely related to the number of observations by country-year combination. In 
columns 3–5, we estimate our baseline specification for alternative subsamples: commercial banks only; only including banks 
with a moderate annual change in total assets (more than –10% and less than 15%); and excluding systemic banking crisis 
periods. Column 6 reports the determinants of bank adjustment speeds using the regulatory capital ratio, defined as Tier 1 capital 
over total risk-weighted assets. We transform continuous independent variables to standard normal variables before being 
interacted with GAPi,j,t−1. Hence, the coefficient λ0, can be interpreted as the speed of adjustment of a typical country (average in 
all dimensions). We cluster standard errors at the country-year level and report them beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Weighted least Commercial banks Normal growth No Regulatory 






































(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010)





(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)









(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017)
Activity Restrictions -0.018 -0.058
*** -0.021 -0.006 -0.020 0.009
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017)
GDP per Capita Growth 0.016 0.028
** 0.017 -0.022
*** 0.015 0.025













(0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.040)
Systemic Stability -0.009 0.004 -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 0.002










(0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.017) (0.030)
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.013 0.000 -0.014 -0.036
*** -0.013 -0.049
***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.006) (0.020) (0.011)
Observations 154,065 154,065 94,610 107,724 132,271 101,856
Adjusted R-squared 0.337 0.340 0.352 0.176 0.299 0.338




Asymmetric Response to Adjustment Factors 
The table provides evidence of whether the cross-country drivers of heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment 
vary with the magnitude of the GAP and bank profitability. In the left part of the table, we split the sample into 
quintiles according to the gap between the target and actual capital ratios and report the results from splits 
based on quintiles 1, 3, and 5 of the gap in column 1. In the right part of the table, we report the results from 
splits based on quintiles 1, 3, and 5 of return on assets.  
In the (unreported) first stage, we estimate the following reduced-form model of the capital ratio, where   is 
the adjustment parameter, X  is a set of bank characteristics, 𝐾 is the capital ratio, and 𝜀 is a random-error 
term: 
 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
We estimate this equation separately for each country using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM estimator to 
mitigate the bias induced by including bank fixed effects in a model with a lagged dependent variable. This 
estimation provides an initial set of estimated βs and λs, which we use to calculate an initial estimated target 
leverage ratio (𝐾ij,t
∗ = β𝑗Xij,t−1) and deviation from the target leverage ratio (𝐺𝐴𝑃ij,t−1 = Kij,t
∗ − Kij,t−1) for 
each bank-year. In the second stage, we substitute the estimated deviation from the target leverage ratio into 
the following equation to produce estimates of the determinants of a bank’s adjustment speed:  
  ∆𝐾𝑖𝑗.𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where Z is a vector of country characteristics and 𝜆0 and Λ are vectors of coefficients.  
We report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The definitions and the 
sources of the variables are provided in Table 1. Continuous independent variables are transformed to standard 
normal variables before being interacted with GAPi,j,t−1. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level 
and are reported beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
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(0.009) (0.061) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014)
Multiple Supervisors 0.045






(0.008) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
External Governance Index -0.019
* -0.034 -0.009 0.001 -0.022 -0.022
(0.010) (0.053) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)






(0.009) (0.040) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012)
Activity Restrictions -0.027
*** 0.046 -0.018 0.012 -0.004 -0.050
***
(0.010) (0.029) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012)
GDP per Capita Growth 0.006 -0.128
**
0.034
*** 0.012 0.025 0.020










(0.032) (0.291) (0.024) (0.036) (0.039) (0.030)
Systemic Stability -0.008 -0.028 0.010 -0.012 0.010 -0.002
(0.009) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012)





(0.034) (0.058) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043)
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.027
** -0.001 0.011 -0.023 0.010 0.014
(0.012) (0.037) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019)
Observations 30,786 30,815 30,820 31,626 31,377 30,703
Adjusted R-squared 0.485 0.009 0.276 0.389 0.332 0.344








Country-Specific Adjustment Speeds 
The figure contains information on the adjustment speed estimates for the 64 countries in our sample and 
are obtained from the estimation of Ki,t = λβXi,t−1 + (1 − λ)Ki,t−1 + εi,t separately for each country 
using the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimator.   is the adjustment parameter; X  is a set of bank-
level and macroeconomic characteristics; K is the book equity ratio; and ε is a random-error term. The 
definitions and the sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.// 
 
ARGENTINA AR 0.33 HONG KONG HK 0.20 PERU PE 0.33
AUSTRIA AT 0.18 CROATIA HR 0.24 PHILIPPINES PH 0.25
AUSTRALIA AU 0.34 HUNGARY HU 0.10 PAKISTAN PK 0.26
BELGIUM BE 0.43 IRELAND IE 0.24 POLAND PL 0.47
BULGARIA BG 0.17 ISRAEL IL 0.24 PORTUGAL PT 0.42
BOLIVIA BO 0.26 INDIA IN 0.32 PARAGUAY PY 0.24
BRAZIL BR 0.49 ITALY IT 0.17 ROMANIA RO 0.30
CANADA CA 0.19 JAPAN JP 0.22 SERBIA RS 0.27
SWITZERLAND CH 0.22 KENYA KE 0.18 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RU 0.37
COLOMBIA CO 0.01 KOREA KR 0.39 SAUDI ARABIA SA 0.29
COSTA RICA CR 0.25 KAZAKHSTAN KZ 0.46 SWEDEN SE 0.28
CYPRUS CY 0.10 SRI LANKA LK 0.22 SINGAPORE SG 0.39
CZECH REPUBLIC CZ 0.36 LUXEMBOURG LU 0.17 SLOVENIA SI 0.21
GERMANY DE 0.15 LATVIA LV 0.19 SLOVAKIA SK 0.38
DENMARK DK 0.53 MACEDONIA MK 0.23 THAILAND TH 0.34
ECUADOR EC 0.06 MEXICO MX 0.30 TURKEY TR 0.57
EGYPT EG 0.37 MALAYSIA MY 0.41 UKRAINE UA 0.51
SPAIN ES 0.34 NIGERIA NG 0.73 USA US 0.34
FRANCE FR 0.13 NETHERLANDS NL 0.37 URUGUAY UY 0.16
UNITED KINGDOM GB 0.15 NORWAY NO 0.19 VENEZUELA VE 0.49
GHANA GH 0.47 PANAMA PA 0.74 SOUTH AFRICA ZA 0.12



















































































































Country Average (red line)=.30, Country Standard Deviation=.15 
